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Abstract 
Training and early Retirement1
 
In this paper we analyze how retirement behavior is affected by a worker’s firm-
specific or general training history. Using US data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Older Men and controlling for the effects of technological change and 
workers’ retirement preferences, we find that workers with a firm-specific training 
history retire earlier than workers with a general training background. This 
indicates that shared investments in firm-specific training are embedded in upward 
sloping earning profiles that create productivity-wage differentials for older 
workers. 
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1 Introduction
The burden of population aging on public and private pension plans is one of the major
challenges in industrialized countries. Responses to population aging focus in particular
on increasing labor supply and delaying retirement. However, life-cycle literature predicts
that employers often provide upward sloping earning profiles to workers with firm-specific
skills, which create a productivity-wage gap for older workers. Therefore firms have an
incentive to send older workers with firm-specific skills into early retirement (see Lazear,
1979; Blinder, 1982). On the other hand, it is assumed that workers with general skills
are paid equal to their value of marginal product. This makes firms indifferent to the
retirement of workers with perfectly general training, under the condition that no other
transaction costs exist.
In this paper we contribute to the existing life-cycle literature by estimating the im-
pact of workers’ firm-specific and general training background on the likelihood of early
retirement. By using the training indicators of Johnson (1996), we are able to increase
insights in the causality between training background and retirement behavior. More-
over, we control for the effects of technological change on retirement, workers’ retirement
preferences and business cycle effects.
The paper is related to the literature on the existence of a productivity-wage gap for
older workers (e.g Lazear, 1979; Blinder, 1982; Medoff and Abraham, 1981; Kotlikoff and
Gokhale, 1992 and Dostie, 2006). These studies measured wage equation slopes in order
to test the prediction that the wage curve will be steeper than the productivity curve and
found that (i) earnings exceed productivity when old, and that (ii) job tenure and wage
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growth affect the likelihood of early retirement positively. Our theoretical framework
builds on Blinder (1982), who developed a theoretical model on the relationship between
firm-specific training, upward sloping earning profiles, the productivity-wage gap and
mandatory retirement.
We find that workers with a firm-specific training history retire earlier than workers
with a general training background. This supports the hypothesis that a productivity-
wage gap for workers with a firm-specific training history induces firms to dispose of
these older workers, while they are indifferent to the retirement of workers with a general
training background. These findings are robust when controlling for clustering of standard
errors and correcting our initial training indicators for job mobility.
This paper is organized in six sections. In the next section, we will discuss our the-
oretical framework. The data is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our
estimation method. In Section 5, we will estimate the impact of workers’ training history
on retirement behavior. Summarizing conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 Theory: Training investments, backward loading
earning profiles and early retirement
We consider an economy in which two types of training exist (Becker, 1975): general
training and firm-specific training. General training increases a worker’s productivity
independently of the firm where he or she is employed. Following human capital theory,
we assume that the costs of training in skills that are perfectly transferable to other firms
will be borne by the worker. As the risk that these workers will leave the current firm
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is very large, workers will pay for the training course by accepting lower wages during
the time that they participate in a training course. In case of general training, workers
will be paid their value of marginal product (VMP ) which makes firms indifferent to the
retirement of workers with perfectly general training, under the condition that no other
transaction costs exist (Dorsey and Macpherson, 1997).
Workers with firm-specific training have human capital that is valuable to the firm
where they work, but not to other firms. This makes firms willing to bear a share of
the costs of firm-specific training. Following Blinder (1982), we expect firms to bear a
share of the training costs by paying workers a wage that exceeds the VMP during the
period in which firm-specific training investments are made (period t0). After the training
investment, the firm pays a lower wage than VMPt to recoup investment costs (until t1
when training costs have been recovered).1
After period t1, firms will have to make an agreement with their workers to share
the returns of the training investment.2 However, as Kennan (1979) remarked, any rent-
sharing rule remains vulnerable to threats to terminate the contract by either side (bilat-
eral monopoly problem). These threats to terminate the contract arise because workers
as well as firms have an incentive to extract extra rent from the other party. The inability
of firms to bind their workers results in a risk that they are not able to fully reap the
rents of the training investment.
1The wage after a firm-specific investment may still be higher than elsewhere, as workers with firm-
specific skills are more productive in their present firm than in other firms.
2The sharing of rents from firm-specific training investments is discussed by Hashimoto (1981). In the
context of a risk of a layoff or quit, the central focus of the model developed by Hashimoto is that worker
productivity is costly to evaluate. Firms only know the current productivity of the workers who they
employ, while workers know their potential productivity. In the presence of such information costs, firms
and workers will share the returns to firm-specific training in order to minimize the loss of separation.
However, Hashimoto implicitly assumes that firms and workers will honor the agreement on the rent
sharing of the return to firm specific investments (Johnson, 1996).
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Kennan (1979) showed that informal bonding is used to prevent bilateral monopoly
problems and to decrease the level of turnover. In the context of firm-specific training
investments, upward sloping earning profiles can be seen as a bond to compensate em-
ployers for quitting while the obligation to pay severance pay in the case of a layoff can be
seen as a bond to compensate the workers. An upward sloping earnings profile means that
workers are paid less than their VMP when they are young (from t1 until t2) and are paid
more than their VMP when they become older (from t2 until t3, the retirement age).
3
This creates a productivity-wage gap for older employees and reduces the uncertainty of
earning the rents after a firm-specific investment for the firms, because employees have an
incentive to stay with the firm as they will earn a high future wage relative to the wage
they are able to earn elsewhere, while firms will have less incentives to extract extra rents
when workers are young and provide severance payments in the case of layoffs to retain
their labor market reputation.4
So, the earning profiles of workers with a firm-specific training history can be divided
in several parts. First, there will be a period in which the firm invests in training and
recoups the training investments (from t0 until t1):
∫ t1
0
(Wt − VMPt)ertdt = 0. (1)
3During the labor contract negotiations, the worker and the firm make an agreement in advance on
the steepness of the backward loading earning profile and the retirement age (Blinder, 1982).
4Other explanations for incentives for long-term employment relationships are given by Lazear (1979)
and Lazear and Moore (1984) who argue that to encourage employees to be trustworthy (and not to shirk),
long tenure incentives should be created. Another reason is that long-term employment relationships
reduce the transaction costs that accompany recruitment and hiring. Moreover, employers have more
information on the ability of their own employees than on prospective employees, which enables them to
offer long tenures to their most productive workers (Johnson, 1996).
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in which r is the discount rate. The second period is the period in which the firm still
pays under the value of marginal product in order to create the upward sloping earnings
profile (from t1 until t2).
∫ t2
t1
(Wt − VMPt)ertdt < 0. (2)
After t2, the firm will pay wages that are higher than the value of marginal product
until retirement:
∫ t3
t2
(Wt − VMPt)ertdt > 0. (3)
The rents have to be divided in such a way, that workers have no incentive to quit their
jobs, while firms wish to retain labor contracts with these workers. Following Blinder
(1982), we assume that the present discounted value of the underpayments between t1
en t2 must be equal to the present discounted value of the overpayments (during the
productivity-wage gap) between t2 and t3:
∫ t3
t1
(Wt − VMPt)ertdt = 0. (4)
Because older workers with firm-specific skills earn more than their productivity, they
have an incentive to retire later. On the other hand, the productivity-wage gap makes
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firms willing to dispose of older workers. To guarantee that the present discounted value of
underpayments is equal to that of the overpayments, mandatory retirement is necessary.5
Due to mandatory retirement, workers with firm-specific skills are forced to retire,
while firms are indifferent to retirement of workers with a general training background.
Therefore, it can be expected that workers with a general training background will retire
later than workers with firm-specific skills.
Moreover, firms may also be able to justify disposal of workers with firm-specific skills
well before the contract retirement age t3 in case of unanticipated changes. Because of
imperfect information or stochastic variation in the value of leisure, market wage rates or
VMP , firms are able to dispose of older workers. To avoid damaging their reputation,
firms pay severance pay which compensates workers for the loss of earnings. These lost
earnings are equal to the difference between expected VMP and expected earnings based
on the upward sloping earnings profile, and are lower than the actual productivity-wage
gap due to the stochastic changes.6
So, we have derived the testable hypothesis that firms are indifferent towards the
retirement behavior of workers with general skills, while firms have an incentive to send
workers with firm-specific skills into an early labor market exit.7
5In theory, a mandatory retirement age is determined during labor contract negotiations.
6Without severance payments, firms destroy their reputation and would soon find themselves without
a labor pool to hire from as workers would not be willing to work for a firm that pays them below VMP
up to time t2 and fires them before t3.
7It should be noticed that the distinction between general and firm specific training is based on
strong theoretical assumptions. Although it may be relevant to loosen these assumptions by introducing
imperfect competition in our analysis (see Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Piscke, 1998), the database
utilized for our empirical analysis contains no information on firm or sector characteristics. However,
by correcting the general training indicator for job mobility in our robustness analysis, we are able to
indirectly analyze the effect of transferable forms of training on the likelihood of early retirement.
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3 Data
The effect of training on early retirement is estimated using data from the US National
Longitudinal Survey of Older Men (NLSOM). The NLSOM is a nationally representative
survey of 5,020 men in 1966 between the ages of 45 and 59 who were questioned periodi-
cally until 1983. Individuals were interviewed 12 times with 1- and 2-year intervals. The
NLSOM is a rich longitudinal dataset with detailed information on employment history,
health limitations, demographics and personal characteristics. Detailed information on
the variables used is given in Annex 1.
During each interview, respondents were asked about their major activity during the
survey week. Based on this variable, we limit our analysis to workers who were not self
employed.8 Retirement status was determined for those who answered for the first time
that they were retired. Approximately 49% of the workers in our sample retired between
1966 and 1983. In 1983, 1,554 workers reported that they were retired, 434 individuals
were still working and 127 individuals workers were not able to work. 1,582 workers died
before 1983. Interestingly, the majority of the workers retired before the institutional
mandatory retirement age of 65 years (average retirement age is 63 years).9 Only 15% of
the workers retired before they reached the age of 60.
8Also, workers who reported a wage below 100 dollar are excluded from our analysis. This reduces
our sample to 4,549 men.
9The institutional mandatory retirement age was 65 until approximately 1979. After 1979, the institu-
tional mandatory retirement age shifted to 70 years. The shift in the institutional mandatory retirement
age is not visible in our database due to the fact that a substantial amount of workers retired before
1980. However, there exists a large literature on the abolishment of mandatory retirement in the US,
due to the stepwise amendments of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The
ADEA was passed in 1967, and protected all workers aged between 40 and 65 from discrimination in
hiring, firing and promotion on the basis of age. The first amendments in 1978 led to the shift in the
mandatory retirement age in 1979, when the enforcement of these amendments intensified. After 1986
mandatory retirement has been forbidden. Most studies find that the end of mandatory retirement led
to an increase in the retirement age, indicating that workers are indeed motivated to work longer due to
backward loading earning profiles (e.g. Smith, 1991, Ashenfelter and Card, 2002).
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Human capital development is influenced by participation in formal and informal train-
ing. Based on the NLSOM, we are only able to analyze the formal training element.The
most relevant independent variables in our analysis are the measures of formal general and
firm-specific training. In 1966, respondents were asked whether they had ever received
formal training. More specifically, questions were asked on participation in vocational
training (excluding on-the-job training), the type and duration of vocational training,
whether respondents used the skills acquired through training on the current or last job
and who sponsored the longest vocational training program.
The training information of the 1966 wave is used to construct two dummy variables
analogous to Johnson (1996). Using the training history prior to 1966 implies that there is
a sufficiently long period between training participation and retirement, reducing possible
causality issues between our measures for training investments and retirement.10 Both
dummy variables are based on the longest vocational training program. The first variable
serves as an indicator for firm-specific training history and equals 1 if workers had ever
received company-sponsored training and still benefit from this training in their current
job. The second dummy variable is a proxy for general training and equals 1 if workers
had ever received other training such as course work at universities or technical institutes.
Possibly, the incidence of specific training is overstated. Pre-1966 training may have been
completed on a previous job, which may imply that the formerly acquired skills are not
specific to the present job. However, by restricting training participation in the training
indicators to people who still use the acquired training in their current job, we partially
10When considering the relationship between training and retirement of workers at the end of their
career, it is hard to establish causality. Workers may anticipate retirement and base the decision to train
on the expected retirement age. Therefore, we do not use the information on training behavior after
1966.
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account for the overstatement of the incidence of specific training.11
In our analysis, we also control for the effects of skills depreciation. Information
on individual skills depreciation is not available in the NLSOM. Therefore, the rate of
technological change per industry in which individuals are employed will be used as a
proxy for skills depreciation. The technological change variables are based on the rates of
industry productivity change calculated by Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) for 35
industry sectors.12 Technological change is measured as the rate of change in productivity
that is not accounted for by growth in the quantity and quality of physical and human
capital. In a seminal paper, Bartel and Sicherman (1983), showed that it is relevant to
make a distinction between the effects of gradual technological change and technological
shocks on retirement. We have replicated their two technological change variables. The
first variable is measured by the mean annual rate of technological change over the 10-
year period before period t, which characterizes the long run differences in technological
change between industries. The second variable is measured by the unexpected change in
the rate of technological change, which is defined as a z-score.
Other control variables in our analysis that deserve some attention are health status
and job tenure. The health variable is a lagged variable that is constructed from answers to
questions on the limitations of health in the working situation. Here, the health limitations
variable is coded 1 if the individuals’ health limits work and coded 0 otherwise. In non-
interview years, we assume that individuals had the same health limitations as in the
11The specific training indicator equals 0 for workers who trained in the past, but do not use this
training in the current job.
12As technological change variables such as research and development intensity and the extent of
computer usage are not available for all industry sectors, we have to use the indirect measures of Jorgenson,
Gollop and Fraumeni (1987).
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preceding year. For 1968, we use the answers to the questions on health change (health
change compared to the previous year) and the effects of the health change on limitations
at work. Job tenure is measured by using answers on questions on job tenure or the year
they started working in the current or last job.
Lastly, we include four variables in our analysis to control for business cycle effects
and retirement preferences: unemployment rate, output growth, a work commitment
variable and one year lagged self reported yearly wages (in logs). The unemployment
rate and output growth indicators are included to account for changes in the business
cycle. The unemployment rate is measured for the civilian non-institutional population
of 16 years and older and is based on BLS Household Annual Averages data. Output
growth, like the technological change indicators, have been divided into two different
variables indicating the gradual change and shock in output growth. Similar to Bartel and
Sicherman (1993), the Jorgenson database is used for our indicators of output growth. The
indicators have been calculated in the same way as the technological change indicators.
The work commitment variable is added in our analysis to account for job motivation and
retirement preferences of employees. The work commitment variable is based on the 1966
question whether respondents would stop or continue working, if they got enough money
to live comfortably. In this study, work commitment is coded 1 if workers replied that
they would continue to work and 0 if they were undecided or answered that they would
stop working. We presume that workers who indicated that they would continue to work,
derive less utility of leisure than workers who indicated to stop working. Higher yearly
wages may also contribute to earlier retirement as workers with higher earnings are likely
10
to have more savings.13
Insert Table 1 about here
Sample means and standard deviations of selected variables are given in Table 1.
The table shows that approximately 4% of all the workers has a firm-specific training
background, while 19% has a general training history. The mean gradual technological
change is rather low with 0,6%. On average, the workers in our sample are relatively low
educated (average is 9 years of education). Workers have an average tenure level of 15
years, are 51 years old in 1966 and are largely committed to their work (75%). 84% of
the men in our sample is married, 32% is non-white and 35% has health problems.
4 Method
The determinants of retirement behavior of workers can be modelled in hazard regression
models. The hazard function analyzes the probability of entering retirement at a certain
age t, conditional on that individuals do not retire before that age, and can be denoted
as:
h(t) = lim
dt→0
Pr(t ≤ T < t+ dt | T ≥ t)
dt
= lim
dt→0
F (t+ dt)− F (t)
dtS(t)
=
f(t)
S(t)
(5)
where T is a random variable with a continuous probability distribution f(t), where t is
the realization of T (retirement). S(t) is the survival function which gives the probability
13On the condition that the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect between earnings and leisure.
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that the spell in which workers remain working is at least t. To estimate the effect of
training and technology on retirement behavior, we use a parameterized proportional
hazard model with a Weibull distribution.14 The Weibull hazard function and survival
function are:
h(t) = pλtp−1 (6)
S(t) = exp(−λtp)
where λ is parameterized λ = exp(Xβ) and p is the ancillary parameter. X contains
several covariates that are expected to influence the retirement decision. Robust standard
errors are adjusted for intragroup correlations across industries.15
5 Results
5.1 Training and tenure
The theoretical framework of Blinder (1982) is based on the assumption that firm-specific
training increases the demand for longer tenure, so that firms can benefit from the rents re-
sulting from the investment. This can be established by providing upward sloping earning
14The Weibull distribution is suitable for modelling data with monotonous hazard rates that either
increase (p > 1) or decrease with time (p < 1).
15We also estimated models accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and occupations
by including a frailty term. We used several distributions for the frailty term. However, the results are
not fundamentally different from the models without a correction for unobserved heterogeneity.
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profiles. Therefore, before we estimated the effects of training and technological change
on retirement behavior, we first analyzed whether this assumption holds by estimating
the correlation between training and tenure rates with OLS. The results of the OLS esti-
mation are presented in Annex 2 and show that our indicator for a worker’s firm-specific
training history is significantly positively correlated with tenure, while a general training
background is significantly negatively correlated with tenure.
Moreover, we analyzed whether our data is compatible with upward sloping earning
profiles. Although we are not able to establish the existence of upward sloping earning
profiles, as we do not have information on the earning profiles of workers before the age
of 46, we are able to compare the wage levels of workers older than 46. Based on our
theoretical framework, we would expect that older workers with firm-specific skills earn
more than workers with general skills. Figure 1 shows the earning profiles of workers aged
46 in 1967. To avoid possible selection effects due to early retirement of workers, we only
display the profiles until this group reached the age of 55. As the figure shows, earnings
of workers with firms-specific skills are indeed structurally higher than the earnings of
workers with general skills or with no training background. This result, together with the
strong correlation between firms-specific history and tenure, suggests that upward sloping
earning profiles are present.
Insert F igure 1 about here
13
5.2 Training history and early retirement
In Table 2 we first present the estimation results of the parametric hazard specification.16
Our estimation results in column 1 show that the human-capital variables affect workers’
retirement behavior significantly in the way we expected. We find that older workers with
a firm-specific training history have a significantly higher likelihood to retire earlier, while
we do not find any effect of general training history on retirement behavior. This confirms
our expectation that backward loading earning profiles lead to a productivity-wage gap for
older workers with firm-specific training, giving firms an incentive to send these workers
into an early labor market exit.
Considering the results for the other variables, we can see that they are consistent with
expectations. The likelihood of retirement increases with a worker’s age and wage level.
The coefficient of the health limitations variable is strongly significant and has a positive
sign, indicating that workers with bad health have a larger likelihood to retire earlier.
Workers with more years of schooling retire later. White older workers retire earlier.
Government employees retire earlier than non-government employees. Work commitment
has a significantly negative effect on the likelihood to retire. Marital status does not
affect retirement behavior. The results for the technological change indicators deviate
from the earlier findings of Bartel and Sicherman (1993). We do not find that gradual
technological change and technological shocks have a significant effect on the likelihood
of early retirement.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 present the same analysis with industry dummy vari-
161/p is positive, smaller than 1 and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the hazard of
failure (retirement) increases with time.
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ables and interaction effects between technological shocks and our training indicators,
respectively. As the table shows, including industry fixed effects does not lead to large
deviations from our initial results. The interaction effects between technological shocks
and the training indicators give an indication of the effects of stochastic changes in VMP
on the labor market position of workers with firm-specific or general training. The coef-
ficients of the interaction effects are not significant, suggesting that firms do not dispose
of their older workers before the mandatory retirement age.17
Insert Table 2 about here
5.3 Business cycle effects
Both early-retirement incentives and our technological change indicators may be subject
to disturbances caused by cyclical factors. Early-retirement incentives may be a conse-
quence of mass layoffs and increased uncertainty resulting from a recession. Also, our
technological change indicators are based on the productivity growth indicators of Jor-
genson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987), which may not only include technological change,
but also the utilization rate. Consequently, we control for fluctuations in the business
cycle and include unemployment variables and output variables in our analysis.
The results of our analysis with the additional control variables for business cycle
effects are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Column 1 shows the estimation
results including the unemployment variable, while Column 2 contains the analysis with
the output variables. The table shows that gradual output growth has a significant
17However, due to the imperfect measurement of training and due to the fact that we do not observe
productivity on an individual level, we cannot draw direct conclusions from these results
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positive effect on the likelihood of early retirement while a high rate of unemployment
has a significant negative effect. However, adding these control variables does not lead
to large differences with our earlier findings. The firm-specific training history of workers
remains to have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of retirement, indicating the
robustness of our earlier findings.
Insert Table 3 about here
5.4 Alternative training indicators
Next, we constructed a training indicator which contains information on workers’ pre-
1966 training participation as well as information on training participation after 1966. As
the likelihood of causality problems (between training investments and retirement) rises
with the use of training data after 1966, we only include the training incidence of workers
younger than 53. The newly constructed training indicators are based on data in 1966,
1967, 1969, 1971, 1976 and 1981. The firm-specific training indicator now equals 1 if
workers who are younger than 53 years participated in company-sponsored training and
still benefit from this training in their present work. General training equals 1 if workers
younger than 53 years responded that they participated in other forms of training.18
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis with our newly constructed training indi-
cators. As the table shows, firm-specific training now only has a weak significant positive
effect on the likelihood of retirement.
18Although this additional analysis takes the training incidence after 1966 into account, we did not
use training information of workers who were older than 52 years in 1966, because of potential causality
problems. As our training history indicators only measure whether workers ever received training, we
now lose potential useful information for workers older than 52 who did train before 1966.
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Insert Table 4 about here
5.5 Job mobility, earning profiles and intermediate training forms
It can be expected that especially workers with steep upward sloping earning profiles are
less mobile across jobs. Therefore, we conducted an additional robustness analysis in
which we corrected our initial training history indicators for job mobility, i.e. the firm-
specific indicator is coded 0 for workers with a firm-specific training history who changed
jobs after 1966. Table 5 gives the results of our analysis with the training history indica-
tors, corrected for mobility. Column 1 shows the estimation results of a parametric model
with the firm-specific training history indicator corrected for job mobility. As expected,
the coefficient of the firm-specific training indicator is higher and more significant than
the coefficient of our initial indicator.
Insert Table 5 about here
Secondly, we also corrected our general training history indicator for job tenure. The
general training history indicator, corrected for job mobility, provides us with a proxy for
’transferable training forms’. As Stevens (1993) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) noted,
when labor markets are imperfect and labor market frictions and institutions compress
and distort the structure of wages, firms will also invest in the general skills of their
employees. These studies relaxed the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets
that underlies human capital theory, and showed that firm-sponsored training arises as an
equilibrium phenomenon. Apart from this prediction, contrasting with standard human
capital theory, these studies showed that the distortion in the wage structure turns general
17
skills into some intermediate form of skills which may have firm-specific value (transferable
training). The key of the noncompetitive training model is the superior information of
current employers regarding its employees’ abilities relative to the information available
for other firms, which creates ex post monopsony power. This leads to a situation in
which trained workers with general skills are not paid their full marginal product when
they change jobs, making general skills de facto specific, creating a situation in which
firms and workers will share in the costs of both firm-specific training and general training.
This makes firms also willing to provide upward sloping earning profiles to workers with
general training. Therefore, it can be expected that due to upward sloping earning profiles,
workers with an intermediate training background and still working in the same firm, retire
earlier than workers with a general training history and working in another firm.
Column 2 of Table 5 give the results of our analysis in which both training indicators
are corrected for job mobility. We now find that both the firm-specific training history
indicator and the proxy for transferable training are positive and significant, although the
size of the coefficient of the firm-specific training history indicator is larger. This confirms
the expectation that firms also provide upward sloping earning profiles to workers with a
general training background, on the condition that they have shared in the training costs.
This provides firms with an incentive to send workers with both a firm-specific training
history and a transferable training background into an early labor market exit.19
Lastly, we conducted an analysis with interaction effects between training (corrected
for mobility) and our indicator for technological shocks. The results are shown in column
3 of Table 5. Again, we do not find evidence that technological shocks lead to earlier
19However, cautioun is necessary when interpreting these results, as workers who are still working at
the same firm may have distinct characteristics which influence the retirement decision.
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retirement of workers with a firm-specific training background.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the relationship between workers’ training history and early
retirement in the perspective of a productivity-wage gap caused by backward loading
earning profiles. The main finding is that workers with a formal firm-specific training
history retire at an earlier age than workers with a general training background. This
indicates that a productivity-wage gap for workers with a firm-specific training history
gives firms an incentive to dispose of older workers with specific training. Even after
controlling for technological change, work commitment, the effects of the business cycle
and clustering of standard errors, the result that a firm-specific training history induces
early retirement remains significantly positive.
The results presented in this paper are highly relevant for public policies that intend
to stimulate labor force participation of the elderly, which have become popular recently
in industrialized countries that face the problems of an ageing population. As our study
demonstrates, the effectiveness of institutional arrangements to postpone retirement also
depends on the training policies of firms.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Dummy: %
Obs. coded 1
Retirement 0 1 48.80
Firm-specific training 0 1 4.08
General training 0 1 18.74
Gradual technological change -.145 .034 .006 .012
Technological shocks -4.05 4.86 -.173 1.37
Race 0 1 31.59
Marital status 0 1 83.84
Years of schooling 0 18.00 9.24 3.90
Tenure 0 67.00 15.04 12.10
Health limitations 0 1 35.32
If government employee 0 1 19.66
Self-employed 0 1 17.40
Age 45.00 59.00 51.50 4.27
Commitment to work 0 1 74.94
Unemployment 3.50 9.60 6.57 1.84
Output growth -.038 .265 .037 .020
Output shock -5.25 15.35 -.049 3.07
Wage level 33.51 50,000.00 6,276.18 4,407.11
N = 4,549. In the Table, we give the percentage of workers who retired between 1966 and 1983.
Observations are censored after the first retirement or until individuals dropped out of the survey.
The firm-specific training and general training indicators are based on the question asked in 1966
whether workers had ever received formal training. Gradual technological change is the mean of
yearly rates of industrial productivity change based on Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987).
The variable which measures unexpected technological shocks is defined as a z-score. The Table
gives the mean years of schooling. Output growth and outputs shocks are calculated analogous to
our gradual technological change and technological shock indicators. The wage level is converted
to constant 1966 dollars.
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Table 2
Weibull regression results: Retirement, training history and technological change
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Retirement (1) (2) (3)
Constant -22.594 -23.764 -23.769
(1.067)*** (1.170)*** (1.165)***
Firm-specific training .285 .239 .238
(.090)*** (.084)*** (.085)***
General training .038 .035 .029
(.064) (.064) (.061)
Gradual technological change .012 .139 .140
(.044) (.104) (.104)
Technological shocks .032 .012 .019
(.035) (.029) (.034)
Int. technological shocks and firm-specific training .051
(.129)
Int. technological shocks and general training -.038
(.032)
Race -.167 -.182 -.182
(.051)*** (.054)*** (.054)***
Marital status -.063 -.061 -.059
(.080) (.077) (.078)
Years of schooling -.046 -.035 -.043
(.007)*** (.007)*** (.007)***
Health limitations .660 .647 .649
(.039)*** (.039)*** (.039)***
If government employee .209 .438 .436
(.093)** (.127)*** (.127)***
Age .205 .219 .219
(.013)*** (.016)*** (.016)***
Commitment to work -.462 -.411 -.411
(.039)*** (.047)*** (.048)***
Log wage .319 .221 .221
(.051)*** (.048)*** (.048)***
Industry dummy variables included included
1/p .266 .253 .253
(.008)*** (.008)*** (.008)***
Log-Likelihood -971.87 -892.83 -892.33
N 3,696 3,696 3,696
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.10.
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Table 3
Weibull regression results: Retirement, training history and
technological change, controlled for business cycle effects
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Retirement (1) (2)
Constant -23.545 -24.401
(1.171)*** (1.099)***
Firm-specific training .251 .253
(.083)*** (.085)***
General training .043 .044
(.063) (.064)
Gradual technological change .124 .105
(.086) (.069)
Technological shocks .024 .016
(.026) (.021)
Race -.186 -.182
(.054)*** (.054)***
Marital status -.060 -.054
(.079) (.078)
Years of schooling -.034 -.034
(.007)*** (.007)***
Health Limitations .644 .646
(.040)*** (.039)***
If government employee .435 .431
(.126)*** (.127)***
Age .219 .218
(.016)*** (.016)***
Commitment to work -.410 -.409
(.047)*** (.047)***
Log wage .220 .221
(.047)*** (.050)***
Unemployment -.103
(.017)***
Gradual output change .126
(.058)**
Output shocks .022
(.018)
Industry dummy variables included included
1/p .241 .241
(.007)*** (.007)***
Log-Likelihood -881.62 -882.87
N 3,696 3,696
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.10.
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Table 4
Weibull regression results: Retirement, training (including training
incidence after 1966) and technological change (robust standard
errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Retirement (1) (2)
Constant -24.593 -24.596
(1.084)*** (1.082)***
Firm-specific training .178 .177
(.104)* (.103)*
General training .086 .084
(.086) (.083)
Gradual technological change .098 .098
(.071) (.070)
Technological shocks .017 .022
(.021) (.025)
Int. technological shocks and firm-specific training .074
(.143)
Int. technological shocks and general training -.042
(.036)
Race -.186 -.186
(.054)*** (.054)***
Marital status -.054 -.053
(.077) (.078)
Years of schooling -.035 -.035
(.007)*** (.006)***
Health Limitations .641 .643
(.039)*** (.039)***
If government employee .431 .429
(.125)*** (.125)***
Age .222 .222
(.016)*** (.016)***
Commitment to work -.414 -.415
(.048)*** (.048)***
Log wage .219 .219
(.051)*** (.051)***
Gradual output change .127 .128
(.059)** (.058)**
Output shocks .021 .021
(019) (.019)
Industry dummy variables included included
1/p .242 .242
(.009)*** (.009)***
Log-Likelihood -882.88 -882.45
N 3,696 3,696
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∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.10. The constructed training indicators are based on data
in 1966, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1976 and 1981. The firm-specific training indicator equals 1
if workers younger than 53 years responded that they had received compony sponsored
training and still benefit from this training in their present work. General training
equals 1 if workers younger than 53 years responded to have received other forms of
training. Although this additional analysis takes the training incidence after 1966 into
account, we do not use training information of workers who were older than 52 years in
1966. As our training history indicators measure if workers ever received training, we
may lose potentially useful information. Moreover, the likelihood of causality problems
rises with the use of training data after 1966.
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Table 5
Weibull regression results: Retirement, training history and technological change,
corrected for mobility and business cycle effects (robust standards errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Retirement (1) (2) (3)
Constant -24.379 -24.322 -24.333
(1.096)*** (1.078)*** (1.070)***
Firm-specific training .378 .444 .444
(corrected for mobility) (.119)*** (.121)*** (.121)***
General training .046
(.064)
General training .338 .333
(corrected for mobility) (.069)*** (.069)***
Gradual technological change .104 .103 .103
(.069) (.069) (.069)
Technological shocks .015 .016 .019
(.021) (.021) (.025)
Int. technological shocks and firm-specific training .089
(corrected for mobility) (.121)
Int. technological shocks and general training -.029
(corrected for mobility) (.052)
Race -.182 -.168 -1.68
(.054)*** (.052)*** (.052)***
Marital status -.056 -.051 -.051
(.077) (.076) (.077)
Years of schooling -.035 -.038 -.038
(.007)*** (.007)*** (.007)***
Health Limitations .643 .656 .657
(.040)*** (.041)*** (.041)***
If government employee .434 .439 .439
(.126)*** (.121)*** (.121)***
Age .218 .217 .217
(.016)*** (.016)*** (.016)***
Commitment to work -.416 -.426 -.427
(.048)*** (.050)*** (.049)***
Log wage .219 .207 .208
(.050)*** (.048)*** (.047)***
Gradual output change .127 .131 .131
(0.58)** (0.58)** (0.58)**
Output shocks .021 .021 .022
(.018) (.019) (.019)
Industry dummy variables included included included
1/p .241 .240 .240
(.009)*** (.009)*** (.004)***
Log-Likelihood -881.28 -870.41 -869.94
N 3,696 3,696 3,696
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∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.10. The training-history indicators are corrected for job mobility.
The indicators are coded 0 for workers (with a training history in their previous job) who left their
initial job after 1966.
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Annex 1
For our analysis on the relationship between training, technological change and retirement
behavior, we used data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men (NLSOM)
for the period between 1966 and 1983. Our indicators for technological change originate
from the KLEM database of Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987), which are matched
to the NLSOM on industry level (2 digit).
Tables A1.1 and A1.2 show the frequency of retirement transitions for each year and
cumulative percentages of retirement transitions at different ages. Table A1.1 shows that
most retirement transitions took place after 1971 while it becomes clear from Table A1.2
that most workers retired between the age of 60 and 65. Lastly, definitions of all variables,
utilized in our analysis, are given.
Table A1.1
Retirement transitions by year
Year Retirement
1967 23
1968 52
1971 147
1973 390
1975 470
1976 244
1978 416
1980 346
1981 173
1983 330
Total 2,591
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Table A1.2
Cumulative percentages of retirement transition by age
Retirement Age Cumulative % Retirement age Cumulative %
47 0.1 61 27.0
48 0.2 62 40.8
49 0.4 63 52.7
50 0.5 64 64.7
51 0.7 65 76.9
52 1.3 66 87.2
53 1.8 67 91.3
54 2.7 68 94.9
55 4.4 69 96.3
56 6.2 70 97.8
57 8.0 71 98.6
58 10.6 72 99.3
59 14.7 73 99.6
60 19.6 74 99.9
76 100
Retirement age is the age on which individuals retire for the first time. Observations were
censored after the first retirement or until they dropped out of the survey. In total 2591
transitions into retirement are observed. Retirement transition takes place when workers state
to be retired for the first time (main activity in last week before survey). Observations were
censored after the first retirement or until they dropped out of the survey.
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Variable definitions
Retirement Retirement transition dummy. The variable is coded 0 if workers remain employed
and coded 1 if workers retire. The variable is based on the question concerning the
major activity during the survey week. Workers who answered to be retired are
assigned the code 1. Observations for each individual are censored after the first
retirement or until they dropped out of the survey.
Gradual technological change Mean annual rate in technological change by industry over the 10-year period before
period t. The variable is based on the KLEM dataset of Jorgenson, Gollop and
Fraumeni (1987) and is measured as the rate of change in productivity that is not
accounted for by growth in the quantity and quality of physical and human capital.
Technological shocks Unexpected change in the industry rate of technological change. This variable is
based on the KLEM dataset of Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) and mea-
sures the deviation of technological change from the mean annual industrial rate of
technological change divided by the standard deviation of all technological change
observations by industry over the 10-year period before period t.
Firm-specific training Firm specific training history. The variable is a dummy, based on the asked NL-
SOM question in 1966 on who sponsored the longest vocational training program.
It concerns training participation during the working life of workers until 1966. The
variable is an indicator for firm-specific training history and equals 1 if a worker
replied that he had ever received company-sponsored training and still benefits from
this training in his present work.
General training General training history. The variable is a dummy, based on the asked NLSOM ques-
tion in 1966 on who sponsored the longest vocational training program. It concerns
training participation during the working life of workers until 1966. The variable
is an indicator for general training history and equals 1 if a worker replied that he
had ever received other forms of training than company sponsored training and still
benefits from this training in his present work.
Race Race dummy. Race coded 1 if non-white.
Marital Status Marital status dummy. The variable is coded 1 if workers replied to be married
(spouse may be present or absent during interview) and coded 0 if workers are di-
vorced, separated, not-married or widowed.
Years of Schooling Years of schooling. The years of schooling variable refers to the total number of years
of schooling of individuals in 1966. After 1966, no information is available on the
years of schooling of individuals. It is assumed that the number of years of schooling
remains the same since 1966.
Tenure Tenure. Job tenure is measured using answers on two types of questions. For 1967,
1968, and 1971, answers to ’tenure on current or last job’ questions were used. For
the other years, we constructed our tenure variable by using answers to ’year started
working on current or last job’ questions. By subtracting the age of workers in the
year that they started working on their current or last job from the age of workers
when interviews were held, we calculated tenure rates.
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Health limitations Health limitations. The ’health limitations’ variable is a lagged dummy variable that
is constructed from answers to questions on the limitations of health on the working
situation. The variable is coded 1 if health limits work and coded 0 if health does not
limit work. In non-interview years, we assume that individuals have the same health
as in the adjacent year.
If government employee If government employee. This dummy variable is coded 1 if workers work for the
government and 0 if not.
Age Age. This variable measures the age of respondents in 1966.
Commitment to work Commitment to work. This dummy variable is based on the asked question in 1966
if respondents would stop or continue working, if they got enough money to live
comfortably. The variable is coded 1 if workers replied to continue to work and 0 if
they replied that they would stop working.
Unemployment Unemployment rates. Unemployment rates of the United States, measured for the
civilian noninstitutional population of 16 years. Source: BLS Household Annual
Averages data.
Gradual output growth Mean annual rate in output growth by industry over the 10-year period before period
t. The variable is based on the KLEM dataset of Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni
(1987).
Output shock Unexpected change in the industry rate of output. This variable is based on the
KLEM dataset of Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) and measures the deviation
of output from the mean annual industrial rate of output growth divided by the
standard deviation of all output observations by industry over the 10-year period
before period t.
Log lagged wage Wage. This wage variable measures self-reported net yearly wages for each individual.
The variable is top coded on 50,000 dollar. All individuals who reported incomes
under 100 dollar are removed from the sample.
32
Annex 2
Table A2.1
OLS Regression results: Tenure and training
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Tenure (1) (2)
Constant -81.724 -78.597
(7.774)*** (7.709)***
Firm-specific training 1.379 1.598
(.424)*** (.421)***
General training -.615 -.472
(.215)*** (.218)***
Gradual technological change .087 .153
(.078) (.078)**
Technological shocks .027 .041
(.058) (.058)
Race 1.893 2.075
(.200)*** (.203)***
Marital status 1.311 1.118
(.257)*** (.255)***
Years of schooling -.067 -.084
(.026)** (.029)***
Health limitations -.430 -.383
(.197)** (.194)**
If government employee -1.108 -.879
(.207)*** (.214)***
Age 1.436 1.361
(.275)*** (.272)***
Age2 -.010 -.009
(.002)*** (.002)***
Log wage 5.464 5.271
(.1287)*** (.133)***
Year dummy variables included included
Occupatation dummy variables included
Adjusted R-square .132 .152
Observations 17,837 17,837
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.10.
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Figure 1
Earning profiles by type of training
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Earning profiles of men aged 46 in 1967. Earnings in US dollars (deflated). Source: NLSOM
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